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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to assess wireless network security holistically and attempts to determine the weakest link 
among the parts that comprise the ‘secure’ aspect of the wireless networks: security protocols, wireless 
technologies and user habits. The assessment of security protocols is done by determining the time taken 
to break a specific protocol’s encryption key, or to pass an access control by using brute force attack 
techniques. Passphrase strengths as well as encryption key strengths ranging from 40 to 256 bits are 
evaluated. Different scenarios are planned and created for passphrase generation, using different 
character sets and different number of characters. Then each scenario is evaluated based on the time 
taken to break that passphrase. At the end of the study, it is determined that the choice of the passphrase 
is the weakest part of the entire 802.11 wireless security system.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The 802.11 wireless Internet and network usage is increasing daily for the benefits and ease of 
use offered to its users. Almost everywhere that people go, including airports, cafes, their homes 
and workplaces, and hotels, they use wireless networks. This increasing usage also brings some 
security concerns. Users require that their sensitive information not be seen or altered by anyone 
else. In addition, users require that any security measure taken will not interfere with their 
working habits; they want the security to be transparent to their normal network usage.  
Many wireless network protocols exist today. Some of them were used in networks a few years 
ago and are no longer used, and some of them are still used in today’s networks. The standards 
are historically outlined below.   
802.11: This is the first standard published by IEEE in 1997. It operates on a 2.4 Ghz frequency 
band and can increase up to 2 Mbps. It is not used at the moment, since the 2 Mbps speed does 
not meet users’ needs. 
802.11a: This is the second standard published in 1999. It operates on a 5 Ghz band and can 
operate at speeds up to 54 Mbps. The main advantage of 802.11a is that it operates at a 5 Ghz 
frequency band, which makes it less prone to interference. It also has more non-overlapping 
channels, which also reduces the possibility of interference. The main drawback of this protocol 
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is that it is incompatible with other wireless protocols such as 802.11b and 802.11g. It is seldom 
used at the moment [1]. 
802.11b: Before the 802.11g protocol, this was the protocol that was most commonly used. It 
operates on a crowded 2.4 Ghz frequency band and can reach speeds up to 11 Mbps.  
802.11g: This protocol is similar to the 802.11b, as it operates on a 2.4 Ghz band, but with 
speeds of up to 54 Mbps. It is compatible with 802.11b, and is the most widely used protocol for 
new installations. 
802.11n: It is designed to produce speeds up to 600 Mbps. This standard operates at 2.4 Ghz 
and/or 5 Ghz.  At the moment, some 802.11n compatible laptops and wireless access points can 
be seen in the market [2]. 
There are numerous wireless security protocols that can be deployed in wireless networks. 
Wireless network security can be divided into three basic layers: [3] Wireless LAN Layer, 
Access Control Layer and Authentication Layer. 
Wireless LAN Layer Security Protocols  is responsible for the encryption and decryption of 
data. These protocols are as follows: 
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy): Despite its name, this is the weakest form of encryption 
security for wireless networks. WEP can use a 64-bit or 128-bit stream RC4 cipher with a 24-bit 
initialization vector (IV), which leads to an effective key size of 40 or 104 bits. RC4 is also a 
weak cipher that can be easily cracked within minutes or hours. 
WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access): WPA still uses RC4 algorithm with doubled initialization 
vector (IV) and supports key lengths up to 152 bits. Recent attacks have targeted the WPA 
algorithm and achieved success on certain specific WPA implementations [4]. 
WPA2: WPA2 uses AES algorithm with varying lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits. The AES 
algorithm is considered more secure than RC4 and uses block cipher, which involves 128 bits of 
data [5]. 
Access Control Layer Security Protocols is responsible for allowing only legitimate users access 
to network resources. For this to happen, this layer of protocols talks to authentication layer 
protocols. The protocols are outlined below. 
802.1X: Originally developed for wired network access control, it is now also widely deployed 
for wireless networks. Many institutions integrate dot1X into their existing local area networks 
and wireless networks. LAN switches and wireless access points must support dot1X in order to 
use this protocol. 802.1X simply obtains user credentials and asks an authentication server 
whether to allow this user or not. It typically asks a RADIUS server, although it is not 
mandatory to use RADIUS. 
RADIUS (Remote Access Dial-In User Service): As its name suggests, RADIUS was originally 
designed for dial-in user access, but it can be used for any access control purpose, including 
dot1X integration. It is a central database of usernames and passwords, as well as some user 
attributes such as VLAN ID [6]. 
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol): This is an intermediary protocol between the access 
control layer and authentication layer security protocols. It can work with a variety of 
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authentication protocols; future authentication protocol support is embedded into the protocol 
(the word ‘extensible’ is used for this behavior). 
Authentication Layer Security Protocols responds to access control layer security protocols. It 
decides who can join the network, and the decision is implemented by access control layer 
security protocols. These protocols are as follows: 
TLS: This is the IEEE standardized version of Netscape’s well-known, widely used SSL 
protocol. It relies on using certificates and symmetric/asymmetric ciphers. The Wi-Fi alliance 
required vendors to support at least the TLS protocol. Therefore, it is widely deployed with 
WPA, and the interoperability between different vendors is high [7]. For wireless security, TLS 
is generally used more often than EAP. 
Kerberos: Invented at MIT during the 1980s, this protocol has undergone some changes, been 
standardized by IETF and reached its fifth version. It relies on the ticket granting concept and 
symmetric ciphers, and is still used in some deployments. 
LEAP (Cisco Light EAP): This is a Cisco devised protocol that is well suited to the 802.1X 
scheme. It is also based on MS-CHAPv1, which is considered an unsecure protocol. 
PEAP (Protected EAP): The PEAP’s main goal is to bring confidentiality to an EAP session and 
safeguard the credentials. If a secure protocol like TLS is not used within EAP, it is strongly 
recommended to use PEAP instead of EAP. 
Other than these protocols, there is another component of the entire system: The users. Often, 
weak passwords are used by them; either short number of characters or dictionary words are 
used. In a work performed by Klein, even using a small 62,727 word dictionary; 25% of 13,797 
passwords were cracked [8]. 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The afore mentioned wireless technologies and protocols provide different levels of security to 
users. In a typical wireless network environment, a blend of these protocols is used. Although 
some protocols and security mechanisms provide adequate security, others may not. Using a 
strong security mechanism with a weak one may decrease the overall security posture of the 
wireless network.  It may also provide its users with a false sense of safety. Most of the time, 
only a few aspects of the wireless network security are considered, while other aspects are 
omitted. Is it possible to analyze all pieces and components of the entire system? Do people 
realize that they are only as secure as the weakest component of the entire system? This study 
aims to find answers to these problems. 
3. OBJECTIVES 
This study aims to explore the 802.11 wireless network security protocols; identifying the 
underlying ciphering algorithms’ strengths based on used key’s bit length, and identifying the 
used passphrases’ strength based on the number and type of passphrase characters used. Then, 
the weakest chain among those two components will be determined and a best practice approach 
to increase the overall security of a wireless network system will be suggested. This is the main 
objective of the study. 
4. METHOD 
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The assessment of security protocols is done by determining the time taken to break a specific 
protocol’s encryption key, or to pass an access control. This time is directly proportional to all 
possible keys that an encryption algorithm may have, or all possible values that an 
authentication protocol may require from the user. It is assumed that application specific 
integrated circuits (ASIC) are used to break any given encryption key.  
In this study, the brute force resistance of security protocols is evaluated by assuming a 10,000 
ASIC chip setup is established, and 1 x 1012 keys per second are tried. By using 10,000 ASIC 
circuits, 100M x 10,000 = 1 x 1012 keys per second can be tried.  A 100 MHz ASIC can try 
100M keys per second [9]. Schäfer [10] stated that it is feasible to achieve 106 encryptions / µ 
second in today’s technology, which is equivalent to 1 x 1012 keys per second.  
Other cryptanalysis methods are not considered, as they are beyond the scope of this study. 
5. RESULTS 
The assessment of a wireless security protocol can be found below by investigating the time 
required to break that specific protocol. 
Table 1: WEP / WPA / WPA2 Key Strength: Cipher Strength 
Key Length Typically Found in Duration of Cracking 
40-bits WEP 240 / 1012 = 1.09951163 seconds 
104-bits WEP 2104 / 1012 = 6.42724504 × 1011 years  
256-bits WPA / WPA2 2256 / 1012 = 3.67174306 × 1057 years 
 
The above table reveals that, without considering the cryptanalysis methods, breaking 40-bit 
keys takes just a second, but breaking 104-bit and 256-bit keys requires a considerable amount 
of time.  Here, the weaknesses of the WEP algorithm and other attack methods may further 
reduce the key-breaking times. 
Theoretically, ten totally random hexadecimal characters as a passphrase for 40-bit WEP, 26 
totally random hexadecimal characters as a passphrase for 104-bit WEP, and 64 totally random 
hexadecimal characters as a passphrase for WPA/WPA2 Phrase Shared Key Mode can be used. 
However, in practice, it is known that this not the case. In their study, Morris and Thompson 
[11] found that among 3,289 user passwords investigated, eighty-six percent of all passwords 
were equal to or less than six characters long or were easily found in a dictionary or name list. 
WPA2 passphrases are another kind of ‘user password’ and have the same vulnerabilities as 
traditional user passwords. A brute force attack analysis of the mentioned passphrases is 
outlined in Table 2.  
In the table, the duration of crack times is calculated using two variables: the first variable being 
the encryption algorithm’s passphrase strength (second column of the table), and the second 
variable being the character sets chosen to generate the passphrase (first line of the table). 
With a 256-bit encryption algorithm, there are 2256 different key possibilities, and this leads to 
3.67174306 × 1057 years of cracking time (Table 1). When using 63-character passphrases, 
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which are created using 26-character sets or higher, even higher calculated values are possible. 
These values have no practical significance and are reduced to 3.67174306 × 1057 years on the 
last line of Table 2.  
Table 2: WEP / WPA / WPA2 Key Strength: User Given Passphrase Strength 
Encryption Algorithms’ Key 
& Passphrase Lengths 
 
Passphrase Character Sets 
Encryption 
Key Length 
(Bits) 
Passphrase 
Length 
(Characters) 
Using 10 
character 
set 
Using 26 
character 
set 
Using 36 
character 
set 
Using 52 
character 
set 
Using 62 
character 
set 
40-bits  
WEP 
5 Characters 
100  
nano- 
seconds 
11.881376 
micro- 
seconds 
60.466176 
micro- 
seconds 
380.204032 
micro-
seconds 
916.132832 
micro- 
seconds 
256-bits 
WPA/WPA2 
PSK 
8 Characters 
100  
micro- 
seconds 
0.208827065 
seconds 
2.82110991 
seconds 
53.4597285 
seconds 
3.63900176 
minutes 
104-bits 
WEP 13 Characters 
10  
seconds 
28.7170471 
days 
5.40552424 
years 
644.093292 
years 
6 338.6573 
years 
256-bits 
WPA/WPA2 
PSK 
16 Characters 2.77777778 hours 
1 381.90719 
years 
252 200.139 
years 
90 564 669.6 
years 
1.51067952 
× 109  
years 
256-bits 
WPA/WPA2 
PSK 
32 Characters 
3.16887646 
× 1012  
years 
6.02632354 
× 1025  
years 
2.00717544 
× 1030  
years 
2.58828625 
× 1035 
 years 
7.20177208 
× 1037  
years 
256-bits 
WPA/WPA2 
PSK 
63 Characters 
3.16887646 
× 1043  
years 
4.40784416 
× 1069  
years 
(calculated) 
3.53152965 
× 1078  
years 
(calculated) 
4.06551865 
× 1088  
years 
(calculated) 
2.63986518 
× 1093  
years 
(calculated) 
256-bits 
WPA/WPA2 
PSK 
63 Characters 
3.16887646 
× 1043  
years 
3.67174306 
× 1057 
years 
(practical) 
3.67174306 
× 1057  
years 
(practical) 
3.67174306 
× 1057 
 years 
(practical) 
3.67174306 
× 1057  
years 
(practical) 
 
Considering the duration of crack times, it is assumed that using a combination of key strength 
and a chosen character set is safe if it takes longer than 89.78 years to decipher the key; this is 
the greatest “average life expectancy of a human at birth” among all the countries [12].  
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Here, it is assumed that the following character sets are used when producing passphrases. 
Usage of different character sets yields different levels of security. 
• Only Arabic numbers: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10 characters) 
• Only Latin lowercase letters: 
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z (26 characters) 
• Only Latin uppercase letters: 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z (26 characters) 
• Either lowercase or uppercase letters + numbers (36 characters) 
• Both lowercase and uppercase letters (52 characters) 
• Both lowercase and uppercase letters + numbers (alphanumeric set) (62 characters) 
From the table, it can be concluded that using five characters (typical for 40-bit WEP) or eight 
characters (minimum character number required for WPA/WPA2 PSK mode) offers no security. 
Even when producing the keys completely randomly from the alphanumeric set, it can be 
cracked in a very short time frame.  
Generating 13 character passphrases by using only numbers or only lowercase or uppercase 
letters offers poor security. Only using numbers and letters combined seems to provide adequate 
security at 13 character passphrases, given that the passphrase is randomly produced. 
Using a 16-character scenario seems to be secure unless the passphrase uses only numbers. 
Using 32 or 63 character seems safe even if the passphrase only contains numbers.  
Table 3: Minimum Number of Characters in the Set to Ensure a ‘Secure’ Passphrase 
Encryption Key Length (Bits) Passphrase Length (Characters) 
Minimum Number of 
Characters in the Set 
40-bits WEP 5 Characters 19 516.289 
256-bits WPA/WPA2 PSK 8 Characters 480.284174 
104-bits WEP 13 Characters 44.6840764 
256-bits WPA/WPA2 PSK 16 Characters 21.9153867 
256-bits WPA/WPA2 PSK 32 Characters 4.68138726 
256-bits WPA/WPA2 PSK 63 Characters 2.19032075 
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For each of the passphrase lengths, Table 3 gives the minimum number of character sets that 
must be used in order to ensure the key can be recovered in 89.78 years. These values are 
calculated by using the following formula:  
 
where y denotes the passphrase length and x denotes the minimum number of characters in the 
set.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
From these findings, it can be concluded that even if WPA2 with a 256-bit AES algorithm is 
used and this algorithm’s code breaking requires 3.67 x 1057 years, using weak passphrases may 
reduce this security level and code breaking times to days or even minutes. The choice of the 
passphrase seems to be the weakest part of the entire 802.11 wireless security system. It is 
advised to ensure that adequate procedures are in place that guarantee that chosen passphrases 
are generated completely randomly, and that passphrases include the minimum required 
characters and are generated from character sets containing the minimum number of elements. 
The assessment is completed by assuming that 10,000 x 100 MHz ASIC circuits are used for 
deciphering the key. Using the CPUs of personal computers or distributed computing may be 
other alternatives.  
This work only focuses on brute force attacks. Future studies may focus on dictionary attacks, 
or using word lists. Furthermore, the entropy of language may be considered. For example, 
Shannon estimates that the English language has entropy of approximately 2.3 bits per letter 
[13], which means that even using a non-dictionary word or phrase may yield a less secure key 
than normally expected. 
This work does not take into account wireless security protocol weaknesses. The key length of 
any given protocol is assumed to be the ultimate criterion. Future studies may focus on protocol 
weaknesses and attacks targeted on them. 
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